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Abstract 
The Carwash corruption probe has had a significant impact on what we know about systemic 
corruption in Brazil. Through the Odebrecht case, it is possible to advance organizational 
corruption theories by seeing how power has been abused over the years to create a systemic 
and enduring corruption system. Inspired by grounded theory, we simultaneously collected, 
codified and analyzed public documents from the plea deals of Odebrecht executives. From the 
empirical data, it is possible to see how second-order corruption has changed rules and norms 
in Brazil. We show that this kind of organizational corruption can be achieved by the abuse of 
relational power. We also demonstrate how second-order corruption is more difficult to 
combat, it normalizes corruption at a structural level, making it appear commonplace, the norm. 
Moreover, individually, it makes people rationalize corruption and distance themselves from 
the act ethically. 
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Introduction 
The Carwash corruption probe is the ‘Largest investigation of corruption and money laundering 
Brazil has ever had’ (Brazil, 2014, p.1). From March 2014 to May 2019 the investigation went 
through sixty-one phases, tackling a corruption scheme involving public officials, directors of 
state-owned enterprises and private companies. Managers from private companies bribed 
executives from the Brazilian state-owned oil company, Petrobras, and other public agents in 
exchange for advantageous contracts. The scheme involved money laundering and illegal 
activities in other countries, such as the United States, Switzerland, Angola and Colombia 
(Brazil, 2014). 
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Odebrecht was the largest private construction company involved. We analyze judicial 
documents from the investigation and the legal process to understand the relationship between 
Odebrecht and the Brazilian state. However, we do not consider the veracity of the crimes 
committed but investigate how the corrupt actors see the corruption process. In this sense, we 
do not judge or attribute crimes to the collaborators or to the people cited by them. Also, we 
only analyzed collaborations that were homologated by the Brazilian Supreme Court. However, 
their description of the company strategy and their perception of the corruption phenomena can 
enlighten corruption theory and show a glimpse of how corruption works inside an 
organization. We argue that the use of the collaborations, even though they are interested 
discourses, allow us to get information directly from corruption agents, which is known to be 
difficult in the fieldwork of corruption researches (Jancsics & Jávor, 2012). 
Lange (2008) argues that corruption studies often focus only on the individual or structural 
features of illegal activities. However, it is still necessary to develop a comprehensive view of 
corruption (Nielsen, 2003; Yu, Kang, & Rhodes, 2018). Zyglidopoulos (2016) defines second-
order corruption as individuals abusing their power to change norms for their benefit. 
Nonetheless, the power to change rules does not depend only on position or authority, but on 
relationships with others. With this in mind, we build upon second-order corruption theory by 
identifying that the powers being abused in the corruption cases are relational (Fleming & 
Spicer, 2014). 
Frequently, organizations are unwilling to open their doors to researchers of corruption due to 
the illegal nature of these activities. Thus, reliable data on corruption is hard to find, especially 
considering that corruption agents are producers of those data (Arellano-Gault, 2019; Campbell 
& Göritz, 2014; Nielsen, 2003). While second-order corruption is well defined in the literature, 
there is still room for development. We look at what kind of power is abused to change norms 
and how this perpetuates misbehavior and corruption (Graaf, 2007; Zyglidopoulos, Hirsch, 
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Martin de Holan, & Phillips, 2017). Using qualitative methodology, we identify the role of 
agents who occupied two key positions in the relationship between the Brazilian state and 
Odebrecht. On the state side, officials and politicians were the ‘political chiefs’ (caciques1). 
On the company side, managers who have an established relationship with politicians are called 
‘godfathers’. 
We highlight that the relationships between godfathers and caciques are central to 
understanding how second-order corruption takes place, creating and changing norms in their 
favor. People who occupy those positions have a considerable level of the individual agency; 
however, their position among various relationships with political parties, other businesses, 
and public officials also binds them. The abuse of this relational power is at the core of second-
order corruption. From their position, one can trace a network of personal bonds between public 
and private agents. They exchange access to power and favors for campaign donations and 
other forms of bribery that evolve into second-order corruption. Changes in norms and rules 
for their benefit also have the normalization and rationalization of corruption as both structural 
and individual consequences, respectively. 
Most definitions of corruption highlight the fact that agents in positions of power seek personal 
gain (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004). However, our study shows that caciques, or political 
chiefs, and godfathers had a more nuanced and complex relationship. They sometimes seek 
personal profit, but at the same time, they always looked after the interests of their 
organizations, especially those of the company and the political party but also their informal 
network of operatives. It is not enough to understand their actions by focusing only on their 
individual gain. It is also necessary to take how they collectively profit from violating rules 
(Palmer & Maher, 2006), taking into account the change in organizational and state norms. 
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We reveal that second-order corruption is created by personal relationships that form a network 
which allows power to be abused. We discuss power in the management literature, social 
exchange and its relationship with corruption. Sequentially we present our methodology 
inspired on grounded theory and analyze the data we gathered to develop the theoretical 
advancement, making propositions based on our findings with a case study of Odebrecht. 
Finally, we present our conclusions, limitations, and ideas for future research. 
Power by structure and social exchange 
Following Zyglidopoulos' (2016) definition of second-order corruption, we look at the concept 
of power and how it relates to the corrupt practices which abuse it. For our purposes ‘Power is 
having the discretion and the means to asymmetrically enforce one’s will over entities’ (Sturm 
& Antonakis, 2015, p.139). Power is also related to dependencies in human relations, whether 
structural or individual (Morgan, 1986).  
Pagès, Gaulejac, Bonetti, & Descendre (1998) show that organizational practices went from a 
traditional system of personal exploitation to a dynamic in which the organization, through its 
structure, culture, and practice, became a source of domination and a holder of power. 
Organizations are structures that support those positions of power. However, individuals are 
actors with the power of agency (Clegg, 1989). Thus, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
existence of power beyond positions of authority and within human institutions. We seek to 
explain how power and its abuse enables acts of corruption. 
Power can influence actions and will (Lukes, 1974). Organizational structures and individual 
power have a dialectical relationship (Lukes, 1974). However, the capacity to exert power is 
influenced by the position occupied within a structure and its network of connections. 
Therefore, this type of power only exists in a given relationship inside organizational structures 
(Clegg, 1989). 
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Once power is exerted, it is manifested through rules and domination, reaching social structures 
and individual actions (Backhouse, Hsu, & Silva, 2006; Davenport & Leitch, 2005). This 
contingent approach is similar to the process of how corruption becomes a norm and changes 
rules for private benefit. Once second-order corruption is in place, new rules are created and 
corruption starts to be normalized, the same way that power can be observed in social structures 
(Nelson, 2017; Zyglidopoulos, 2016).  
Fleming and Spicer (2014) identify four facets of power. (1) The coercive form makes someone 
do what would not be done if there were no power relationship. (2) The manipulation facet is 
composed of rules and norms constructed in the face of the performance of power. (3) 
Domination consists of the construction of ideological and dominant views. Finally, (4) 
subjectivation is the change of self, identity, and emotion. Each of these can be seen in the sites 
of organizational power (within, through, over and against organizations). The power within 
organizations is exerted in the formal limits of influence and capacity of organizational change. 
Power through organizations occurs when the organization is used for certain interests. Power 
over organizations is identified as a situation in which one has power or control over an entire 
organization. Finally, power against organizations is identified as attempts to threaten the 
organizational status quo (Fleming & Spicer, 2014). 
The power of manipulation is specifically related to rules and norms (Fleming & Spicer, 2014). 
Sturm and Antonakis (2015) develop a model of interpersonal power in which individual, 
group, organizational and country factors serve as moderators to the use of power to harmful 
outcomes. The authors suggest that researchers should focus on the study of different types of 
power, its psychological aspects, and institutional underpinnings. We approach those aspects 
with an empirical study and look at the interpersonal power with that multilevel approach. In 
this sense, the individual power of an agent may be accessed by other agents. 
6 
 
From these two frameworks, we can investigate political and organizational power from an 
individual perspective. Political chiefs and executives had their respective power given through 
their position in the structure. Executives have coercive power over their subordinates, 
manipulate rules inside the organization, and create or disseminate culture as leaders. 
Corruption becomes normalized inside the organization when middle and low levels accept it 
(Jávor & Jancsics, 2013). This idea is well conceptualized in the assumption that corruption is 
socially constructed (Warburton, 2013). Therefore, it grows within a network through 
interaction between individuals (Kim & Lee, 2019).  
Political chiefs also have individual power due to their position in political party structures and 
their role in the distribution of campaign donations; also, the ideology of the party moves the 
group towards their goal. While both political chiefs and executives have personal power 
within their organizations, their relationship is complementary, that is, they can use the position 
of other for personal or organizational gain. In other words, executives have the ability to 
choose and deliver contracts in the interest of politicians and they could make campaign 
donations and bribes, thereby ensuring influence over the next election (Aggarwal, Meschke, 
& Wang, 2012). Political chiefs, from their end, could hand out contracts and adjust norms to 
benefit the company (Reeves-Latour & Morselli, 2017). Those are complementary powers to 
be abused and exchanged in a corrupt relationship. 
The asymmetry of power between organizations has been studied in business-to-business 
relationships (Nyaga, Lynch, Marshall, & Ambrose, 2013). However, we aim to contribute by 
highlighting the aspects of power that individuals can abuse. In that sense, we look at how 
individuals in positions of power and their relationships can change norms and rules to their 
benefit. So, we define relational power as the ability to access and use the power of another 
person through a symmetrical relationship. Note that both agents have different powers and 
they can exchange them through their mutually beneficial relationship. 
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Power is in relationships between individuals as well as in systems, structures, ideas, and 
identities, albeit less perceptible (Pagès et al., 1998). Power can be enacted in many forms 
inside organizations and to different objectives (Fleming & Spicer, 2014). It puts structure, 
position and agency combined and acts among social relations. We bring the framework of 
social exchange from Fiske (1992) to help explain the interactions between individuals into 
relational power examples. By combining Fiske's (1992) model with the model proposed by 
Fleming and Spicer (2014), we look into individual social interactions and the faces and places 
of power that emanate from this relational power. 
Fiske (1992) proposes that all human interaction can be described as one of four types of 
sociality. (1) Communal sharing is when people contribute what they can in a pool of resources 
and get the amount they need without keeping track; such relationship is ideally eternal. (2) 
Authority ranking is when social interactions occur along hierarchies where the superior has 
power over the subordinate and at the same time is responsible for the decision making and 
distribution of resources. (3) Equality matching is when people exchange in equal parts and are 
always compensated for what they get. Finally, (4) market pricing describes relationships 
where people obtain access to resources for an accorded price. 
Fiske’s  (1992) model was studied alongside issues of power, especially authority ranking 
relations (Schubert, 2005). In that sense, most studies deal with hierarchy and positions of 
authority and the abuse of that authority (e.g., Aguilera & Vadera, 2008; Fath & Kay, 2018; 
Rosenblatt, 2012). We contribute to a less researched idea that two individuals in powerful 
positions can have relational dependencies and engage in corruption due to their 
complementary sources of power (Warburton, 2013). It is true that they coerce, manipulate, 
dominate or change the identities of others in some of the four organizational places. However, 
it is the exploitation and abuse of communal sharing, equality matching, and market pricing in 
the social exchange between two people with different powers that enable that coercion. 
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By combining both models we can define relational power. Both agents have power given by 
their own position in the structure. However, their relationship and exchanges create power 
that has a practical effect both inside and outside the relationship in the form of social 
interaction, faces and places of power (Fiske, 2004; Fleming & Spicer, 2014; Schubert, 
Waldzus, & Seibt, 2008). Corruption occurs when this relational power is abused for individual 
or organizational benefit. That said, it is possible to see how corruption stems from the abuse 
of power to create norms and rules. 
Corruption and abuse of power 
A classic definition of corruption describes it as conduct by a public official that deviates from 
their roles in pursuit of personal gain. However, this conceptualization only considers the role 
of public agents (Brei, 1996; Nye, 1967). Corruption emerges from the relationship between 
public and private agents. It appears when individuals act for personal gain but also to maintain 
their position inside a larger network, undermining the public good.  
An axis from the individual to the structural level can be traced. Pinto, Leana, and Pil (2008) 
discuss this difference between organizations of corrupt individuals, when the beneficiary is an 
individual, and corrupt organizations when the beneficiary is the organization itself. Between 
them, there is a corruption threshold, a point from which combating corruption requires a 
systemic approach that changes organizational processes (Pinto et al., 2008). 
We saw that power develops within relationships between individuals and the structures in 
which they participate. Corruption is the abuse of this power. In this sense, ‘[t]he focus on 
individual and organizational/societal attributes has led researchers to neglect an important 
additional consideration: relationships among actors’ (Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998, 
p.14). This argument also corroborates the multilevel approach focusing on relationships 
(Moliterno & Mahony, 2011). Corruption is a process that is engaged in by collectives in a 
network relationship, rather than only individuals (Nielsen, 2003; Palmer & Maher, 2006). The 
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multilevel approach aids the study of both the individual and the structural phenomena, in a 
system of corruption (Jancsics & Jávor, 2012).  
In describing the corruption network, it is possible to understand how companies interact with 
the state and build their systemic relationship. Complex corruption cases are based on the 
safeguards given by friendship and family ties; they eliminate market competition, a natural 
form of combating corruption (Husted, 1994). Agents form a corruption network by collusion 
(Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Brass et al., 1998). The idea of established networks is key to 
understanding how executives collude with politicians.  
This kind of networked corruption can be called cronyism, which is a specific type of 
corruption where private agents make recurrent payments to public officials, in this case, to 
change norms in their benefit (Dobos, 2017; Khatri, Tsang, & Begley, 2006). The concept of 
crony capitalism is well established in Brazil with the idea of personal relationships between 
executives (Lazzarini, 2011; Reeves-Latour & Morselli, 2017). However, Operation Carwash 
reveals that this network could involve politicians and create rules in favor of corruption 
activities (Carazza, 2018; Castro & Ansari, 2017). Therefore, cronyism as exchanges between 
personal acquaintances develops into second-order corruption in a network system. 
This network development of cronyism goes beyond simple transactions of power or resources. 
Politicians have access to regulatory power and public contracts, while businesspeople have 
money to make campaign donations and are interested in public contracts. Their social 
exchanges over time developed into a network of collusion and systemic corruption that goes 
beyond equality matching, giving them individual and organizational benefits (Fiske, 1992). 
What may have started as cronyism developed into systemic organizational corruption 
(Nielsen, 2003; Pinto et al., 2008). 
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While corruption activities depend on the power held by individuals, it is the relationship 
between individuals with different powers that allows abuse of relational power. This merges 
Zyglidopoulos' (2016) definition of second-order corruption with Pinto et al.'s (2008) idea of a 
corrupt organization. The corrupt organization (where processes are corrupt) results from the 
abuse of relational power to change rules (Fleming & Spicer, 2014).  
Going deeper, corruption creates norms to benefit agents or organizations (Pinto et al., 2008; 
Zyglidopoulos, 2016). Power, as we saw, is reified in rules that become accepted (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Nelson, 2017). As Barley and Tolbert (1997) note, agency power creates, 
maintains and transforms institutions, and rules are specific aspects that turn common 
behaviors into mandatory courses of action (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Thus, second-order 
corruption normalizes misbehavior, thereby transforming acts of corruption into rules.  
Normalization leads to the rationalization of corruption. Rationalization is the search for 
redemption from an act that is morally wrong (De Klerk, 2017). It creates excuses to gain 
ethical distance. According to Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2008), this ethical distance is a path 
in the ‘continuum of destructiveness’. Individuals go from innocent bystanders to guilty 
perpetrators, passing by innocent participants and active rationalizers by getting closer to the 
corrupt act, until effectively they are either doing it or denouncing it (De Klerk, 2017; 
Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). 
De Klerk (2017) describes the types of rationalization and unconscious motives for it, arguing 
that corruption agents may seek redemption by displacing responsibility, making an allegation 
of legal ignorance, minimizing consequences, refocusing attention to other problems, making 
social comparisons, feeling entitled to corruption, appealing to higher loyalties and 
rationalizing their intention. If corruption becomes normal, agents rationalize and perpetuate 
unethical behavior (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). 
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By adding the idea of power to recent developments in corruption theory, it is possible to see 
that corrupt organizations can be systemic and hierarchically established; they abuse relational 
power to change norms for private benefit. The consequences of this power through 
organizations are the normalization and rationalization of corruption. These statements make 
sense in theory; however, they must be grounded on empirical bases. To this end, we conducted 
a study with a Brazilian case of systemic corruption that involved executives and politicians in 
collusion to change norms and rules to their benefit. 
Method 
Odebrecht activities mainly involve construction contracts but also public concessions, fuel 
refineries, the real estate sector, and engineering solutions. Although the company started in 
Brazil in the 1940s, it currently operates in fourteen countries and has expanded its business in 
close association with governments, through public contracts and funding (Rêgo, Dib, & 
Bemvindo, 2016). Its probable involvement with corruption has already been implied through 
other high profile scandals involving politicians at the federal level (Valente, 2016). However, 
those scandals did not have major consequences for the organization, and the firm maintained 
its relationship with the government without changing its strategies.  
Odebrecht has a lasting relationship with governments and was implicated in, at least, two 
corruption investigations before the Carwash. This history had concrete effects on rules and 
norms. Therefore, the size and time span of the case allow us to describe how power has been 
abused, enabling norms to be changed, both within the organization and outside of it. Second-
order corruption had already established cultural and institutional norms during the years of 
involvement between Odebrecht and the public sphere. That is why Odebrecht is an extreme 
example of a case study that can develop the concepts of systemic and second-order corruption, 
empirically demonstrating how the abuse of power can change rules. 
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A qualitative case study is appropriate to improve second-order corruption studies, given that 
there is a need for empirical studies on this theme, and to gather data produced by corruption 
agents. After defining the concept of second-order corruption, researchers need to explore how 
the concept works and which power it implies. To do that, the qualitative approach is suitable 
because it empirically explores the mechanisms that can change norms and rules in an extreme 
or unique case (Eisenhardt, 1989). More specifically, the description of the Odebrecht case can 
give insights and generate propositions from its uniqueness to be further developed in future 
studies (Yin, 2003). 
We used qualitative data from the Carwash judicial processes, such as testimonies, inquiries, 
petitions and, more importantly, the results of plea bargains (Delação premiada), a judicial 
process in which the defendant agrees to denounce other crimes and people to reduce their 
sentence by providing evidence. While 77 executives made plea bargains, we read through 55 
of them that had their testimonies available. We chose to deeply analyze three key executives 
because they were from the upper echelons of the company and had knowledge of the whole 
scheme. Their collaborations allowed us to understand the various dialogic processes between 
caciques and godfathers. They were also the longest testimonies in the collaborations, with the 
largest level of support documentation for different cases that are now being investigated. 
The choice of these three executives was due to their decision-making power within the 
company; the relevant and complementary information they supplied on various cases; and the 
use of those testimonies to start a high-profile investigation into Brazilian federal government 
politicians. Most of the other 52 executives were from the middle or lower levels of the 
company, their testimonies were smaller and related to specific crimes, not on how the entire 
corruption scheme functioned. In summary, those three executives and the key positions they 
held complement each other, describing how the abuse of power changed norms - both inside 
and outside the organization. 
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The data are composed of various texts, audios, transcripts, videos, and documents. We decided 
to use grounded theory techniques to code and retrieve information from the data with the 
support of a Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). In total, we 
codified 422 written documents and 25 hours of video testimonies, all of which were sourced 
from the plea bargains and the judicial processes. 
The qualitative approach enables this in-depth description of associations between various 
actors but maintains focus on key agents and aspects of the corruption system (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). The case covers the need for empirical studies of second-order corruption in 
an in-depth analysis, contributing to theory building in organizational corruption studies 
(Transparency International, 2017; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2008). 
The analysis commences with the public videos of depositions. The coding of videos was done 
by marking the time of beginning and end of a video section, transcribing that passage, and 
coding to identify it. The use of this type of data requires an initial view and cataloging, and 
later, an in-depth analysis (Heath, Hindmarch, & Luff, 2010). The textual documents and 
further evidence were analyzed alongside the respective videos to gain a better understanding 
of the matter. All data was in Portuguese, therefore we translated it after the analysis to present 
the results. We tried to keep the meaning of the sentence and the phrasing of the collaborators 
as close as possible to the original. 
The CAQDAS was used in the process of collecting, codifying and analyzing data in different 
formats (Bringer, Johnston, & Brackenridge, 2006; Charmaz, 2000). Through coding, it was 
possible to reconstruct the characteristics of the actors from Odebrecht and from the State, as 
described by the collaborators. We portrayed characteristics of their relations, such as money, 
friendship, jobs, history, interlocutors and intermediaries. It was possible to see patterns of 
relationships between a company executive and a politician. We were able to describe the case 
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of Odebrecht as our unit of analysis and how the corruption activity worked through examples 
of abuse of relational power and the use of corruption culture in the company, with specific 
rules and sectors created to make illegal payments.  
Inspired by the grounded theory, the process of coding the material started with two major 
groups of codes. One that described the crimes and processes and the other more thematic and 
theory-based. 
The first group of codes explained the corruption scheme and process inside and outside the 
organization, the names of the people involved, and the case being denounced. These codes 
revealed how corruption had worked empirically, also they highlight the cases we describe in 
the analysis section. More specifically, these codes demonstrate how the collaborators 
described the creation of the caciques and godfathers strategy, how they created the structured 
operations sector and made the illegal payments and the results of their actions within and 
outside the company such as paying for laws and the creation of organizational rules. From 
these codes, we were able to select the events to be presented in the analysis section and to 
divide them into changed rules from within and outside of the organization. 
The second type of code relates to theoretical insights such as the presence of power, personal 
relationships, a culture of corruption, etc. In this sense, these codes occurred in more than one 
case described by the collaborators; therefore, they contribute to the foundation of our 
propositions. The codes emerged from the description and comparison of events, revealing 
recurrent facts and actions. These were coded depending on how they were related to the 
functioning of the corruption system. The case descriptions from the three collaborators allow 
us to tell their stories from different perspectives on the same corruption cases. These codes 
could also be grouped into categories directly related to the theory. This second type of code 
emerged from the data and their categories can be seen in table 1. 
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Table 1: Second group codification process 
Categories Definition Codes Explanation 
Quote Example (Collaborators 
testimonies) 
Power 
Group of 
codes related 
to the abuse 
of power for 
individual or 
organization
al gain 
Personal 
Relationship 
Close relationship 
with people that 
could give access 
to power 
‘Both people had the power of 
influence in the political system’ 
Expectations 
Relationships 
based on 
dependency and 
expectations 
‘The more he sees that you are 
helping, the more you create an 
expectation for the next election. 
It is a fluid thing’ 
Trust 
Relationships of 
trust 
‘So, he [executive] was supposed 
to have a close, trusting 
relationship with [political 
agents]’ 
Second-
order 
corruption 
Group of 
codes that 
describe the 
creation or 
alteration of 
rules to 
sustain 
corruption 
systems 
Structured 
operations 
Payments through 
the corruption 
sector 
‘[The payment was made] by the 
slush fund system, operated by 
the system of structured 
operations of Odebrecht, in Cash’ 
Bribery 
Payments for 
direct returns such 
as the approval of 
laws  
‘From what has been explained to 
me, a reduction of 9 million was 
granted in exchange for the 
payment of 2 million, having a 
saving of 7 million, in an 
electricity bill’ 
Public 
contracts 
Corruption in 
public contracts 
‘By allowing the market to be 
organized [as a trust] there was 
an illegal payment of 3% of each 
contract’ 
Normalizat
ion 
Group of 
codes that 
makes the 
corruption 
appear to be 
normal or 
commonplac
e 
Culture 
Values and 
assumptions 
shared within the 
company 
‘Unfortunately, the culture was 
created, we grew up thinking that 
illegality and the question of 
bribes each person accepts, which 
type of payment’ 
Rules 
Rules of the 
company 
regarding 
corruption 
‘Slush Funds were all generated 
abroad’ ‘Everything done in cash, 
always’ 
Information 
technology 
Systems used to 
corrupt activities 
‘It is the system that controls 
illegal payments’ ‘It was not 
supposed to exist’ 
Rationaliza
tion 
Group of 
codes where 
unconscious 
redemption 
of guilty 
behavior 
appears 
Legitimate 
Excuse of 
corruption act as 
legitimate 
‘Even in the pursuit of legitimate 
interest as I mentioned [...] you 
end up [...] engaging in some 
illegal behavior’ 
Better for 
the Country 
Excuse of 
corruption act as 
good for the 
country 
‘What exists today in the country 
is a result of our initiative and 
contribution’ 
Source: Made by the authors based on the collaboration reports. 
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The stories, such as the relationships with various political actors, the corruption of the bidding 
processes and the payment of bribes to pass laws in Congress were compared with each other 
to look at the similarity and cooccurrence of codes, defining those deemed more important. 
The second stage of the analysis grouped these codes into concept categories. Power, 
rationalization, normalization of corruption and second-order corruption were the main ideas 
that formed our propositions when related to theory.  
The constant comparison of empirical data with theory enabled the development of concepts 
on corruption and the analysis of the production of meaning by the actors involved in 
corruption. Thus, we understood how the executives reported the phenomenon (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Suddaby, 2006) and enhanced theoretical and empirical concepts.  
However, all the documents used in this analysis should be considered as positioned discourses. 
They aim to produce certain effects on their audience. A plea bargain is part of a judicial 
process. The actors producing discourses and evidence have a vested interest in the results of 
their agreements with the judiciary. Leniency agreements and plea bargains are options that 
oblige defendants to contribute to the investigation (Brasil, 2011, 2013). However, judiciary 
documents may still be more truthful then what is exposed in the news (Shapira, 2016). While 
leniency is granted by administrative bodies, such as the Administrative Council for Economic 
Defense (CADE) and the General Controller of the Union (CGU), the collaborations are 
homologated by the Judiciary with the participation of the Public Prosecutor.  
We acknowledge that the company and its employees were interested in reducing their 
sentences by admitting guilt and collaborating. They provided information on other people 
involved in the schemes and brought more detail to the cases in which they participated.  
Some of the bias in the data was mitigated due to constraints of the process. The executives did 
not know what information the prosecutors already had. Nevertheless, it is always necessary to 
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approach the data critically, and double-check to avoid opportunistic and individualist 
narratives, to appropriately correlate the facts, aiding broader comprehension of the whole 
process. For corruption cases and data on legal processes, it is important to critically consider 
the data during analysis. 
Furthermore, it is not our role to accuse or condemn the collaborators. To avoid any injustice 
to the people involved and to respect their long-term rights in accordance and compliance with 
the suggestions made by an ethical research committee, we took care not to identify any of the 
informants. We also had to maintain a healthy level of skepticism regarding their stories.  
Under those assumptions, the data is still valid as a description of second-order corruption. By 
approaching it critically, it is possible to see that the mechanisms of blaming the culture, the 
system or the company were part of a rationalization and normalization process that we 
included in our propositions. In that sense, the information we analyzed enabled the 
investigation of the mechanisms of corruption and how the collaborators pictured them.  
Following procedures from grounded theory, we first present the case and its contexts 
highlighting organizational and state norms changed as a result of corruption. Then, we 
demonstrate how the empirical data help to build on the second-order corruption theory by 
drawing propositions (Strauss, 1987). 
Analysis and Discussion 
Odebrecht is the largest of the twenty-three engineering companies prosecuted in Operation 
Carwash that started in 2014 and continues to this day. The operation focus was on a corruption 
scheme that involved politicians, state-owned companies such as Petrobras and companies 
from various sectors. The plea bargain and the institutional readiness to combat corruption were 
key mechanisms used by the operation to grow (Castro & Ansari, 2017). Among the arrested 
were businesspeople, lobbyists, politicians, former presidents, and others. ‘It is not a matter of 
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five years, ten years ago, we are talking about thirty years ago’. (Collaborator testimony2). 
The cases being investigated go as far as the 1980s and give us a picture of how corruption 
evolved into a systematic and incorporated practice in Brazil (Brasil, 2014).  
The long-term relationships revealed by the operation show an increasing level of 
professionalism in corruption over the years. They helped to create organizational norms and 
laws in their favor. Due to the amount of data available on various episodes of corruption, it 
was not possible to present all cases in one article. In the analysis, we discuss the changes in 
norms inside and outside the company, as pointed by the collaborators.  
To explain kinds of power related to changes of norms inside the company, we describe two 
stories: the strategy of personal relationships between caciques and godfathers, and the 
structured operations sector for illegal payments. To explain the changes outside the company 
we present three stories: the purchase of the presidential act (MP470); the agenda of policies 
between executives and political chiefs; and the Corinthians Stadium. We chose those cases 
because they were more contextual in the overall mechanism of corruption, they also had more 
facts and evidence to help give a better description from the points of view of the three 
collaborators. 
Changing norms inside the organization  
Firstly, we must define the agents and their position in the hierarchy. Brazilian caciques have 
access to power and influence over other politicians on a large scale (Roniger, 1987). ‘That 
cacique matter was common, in every election, the caciques of the parties asked for resources 
for their support group’ (Collaborator testimony). They operate in various roles within the 
political sphere of the country, either in government or in the opposition. Caciques receive 
campaign contributions from executives and distribute them inside the political party. In return, 
they grant favors to the executives using their political influence and network of contacts. 
Although in other countries caciques had a definition prior to this study, as a politician with 
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great influence (Anderson, 1988; Choi, 2007; Nunes, 2003), we add to their role their 
responsibility for collecting and distributing legal and illegal money.  
He acted as a collector of the first national [Party Name] campaign, party of which he was one of 
the founders; that this donation sought not only to strengthen the relationship of [the company] with 
[a politician] and with the new party founded, it was to create a differentiated relation next to the 
candidate who had an excellent relationship with the postulant to the presidency (Collaborator 
testimony). 
On the company side, their contacts are called godfathers, which is a term commonly 
understood as having connotations of family or a close friend. ‘Every person has a godfather 
in the house [Odebrecht] who is responsible for a given situation’ (Collaborator testimony). 
The godfathers are responsible for maintaining personal relations with a political group, a 
specific political chief or the politically nominated president or director of a state-owned 
company. This godfather builds a personal relationship with his contact to maintain their 
system of corruption and influence over political decisions that favor the company, a type of 
lobby that buys votes from legislators through a personal relationship built with illegal money. 
 Basically, you always had, with all state-owned companies, a godfather, someone who dominated 
the relationship, internally or through an old relationship, or through the strength of the business. 
Other companies [than Odebrecht] also interacted with that company or that ministry or any public 
entity.  (Collaborator testimony).  
For the executives, to collaborate meant to lose friends, which shows how close they were with 
their contacts in the power structure. 
 I'm losing, in this collaboration, about 30 friends, one quality I have is that [...], every time I created 
a relationship with a person the relationship became personal. So, I'm losing 30 friends who, from 
tomorrow, from the time they read, they will call me a scoundrel to defend themselves. I use a 
phrase with my lawyers, that when the need comes in through the door, morals leap out the window 
(Collaborator testimony). 
Even the presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate had their godfather. He was 
an executive who had personal relationships with them both and influenced debates in 
Congress. Access to the presidents of the federal legislative bodies gave Odebrecht huge 
influence over the matters discussed in Congress, which means companies controlling 
institutional change as suggested by Zyglidopoulos (2016). The data show that the designation 
of this kind of relationship was strategic within Odebrecht, normalizing corruption in the 
20 
 
company (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). ‘The person from the Odebrecht Group who had a 
relationship of trust with the caciques of the (Party name) of the House and Senate, including 
for bribery price negotiations, was (Name)’ (Collaborator attachment text file) 
Personal relationships enhance corruption and political chiefs oversee the distribution of legal 
and illegal campaign donations. This clientelism and cronyism result in political cliques at an 
individual level based on reciprocity (Brass et al., 1998; Roniger, 1987). It cannot be said that 
politicians or executives exerted more power. They both exercised power from their positions 
in the structure and their close relationship. Therefore, when they reached an agreement on 
campaign donations, some kind of counterpart was expected from the executive, in the same 
way when the politician changed laws or arranged contracts for the company, he expected some 
kind of monetary incentive, in a quid pro quo and friendship relation (Fiske, 1992). ‘There was 
an expectation of contribution, whether it was aligned with specific counterparts or created an 
expectation, but it came from large, large values’ (Collaborator testimony). 
Within a larger network structure of those types of relationships, they needed to involve 
‘middlemen’ and ‘brokers’ (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). These intermediaries, people chosen 
by politicians and executives, were responsible for fulfilling the agreement. Middlemen could 
be friends, family, politicians, employees, and even other companies who would agree on 
amounts and handle the negotiation. ‘I cannot attest that we talked directly with her, it may 
have been with a middleman very close to her, the [politician] seeks to preserve himself and 
places a representative’ (Collaborator testimony). Brokers are the people sent by executives 
and politicians to make the cash delivery or the currency exchange operation.  
[He] was our biggest and closest operator. For security reasons and to avoid the risk of 
contamination with other companies, he was contracted exclusively to set offshore companies and 
carry out payments on our order, which were supplied by Odebrecht's undeclared offshore 
companies (Collaborator testimony). 
Empirical data shows that the choice of each contact, between political chiefs and godfathers, 
was based on their relationships and company hierarchy. The higher the position in the 
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hierarchy at Odebrecht, the more important the executive contact was in government. As 
predicted, this shows how power emanates not only from positions but also from relationships 
(Fleming & Spicer, 2014). Thus, the corruption system has a hierarchy running parallel to that 
of the company. The CEO was responsible for Brazil presidential campaign, ‘The CEO of 
Odebrecht SA, in this case, was not involved in state, municipal or other country campaigns’ 
(Collaborator testimony). This means that inside the organization and the state there were 
relations of authority rank (Fiske, 1992), where subordinates receive orders from their superiors 
and are responsible for different political positions. However, each godfather had the autonomy 
to decide how much money they would donate to politicians, knowing that this money was 
going to be discounted from their projects and bonuses. Political chiefs had the role of 
distributing money to less powerful public agents. 
The strategy of having a godfather for every cacique had consequences over the years. They 
created a routine of campaign contributions based on election years. Executives and politicians 
became friends. This created elements which normalized routines and enhanced the 
rationalization process. The collaborators often stated that it was the way of the company and 
that they had to exempt themselves from guilt (De Klerk, 2017).  
‘This was a problem that we had throughout Brazil because a vicious circle was created. I 
estimate that three-quarters of Brazilian campaigns were from slush funds’ (collaborator 1). 
That number may be overestimated since other executives reported that only twenty percent of 
the donations were from slush funds, but that those numbers grew over the years. Nevertheless, 
it can be agreed upon that Brazilian campaign donations had a parallel scheme of illicit 
transactions (Carazza, 2018). 
There were also structural changes inside the company. Odebrecht made most payments using 
a specific department responsible for collecting slush fund cash from different resource centers, 
22 
 
then allocating it overseas to make the payment to people in the government. The model was 
created in the 1990s. In 2005, a new director improved the methods and the sector was 
nominated ‘Structured Operations’ allocated in the holding company. They intended to 
separate the source of the bribery from its distribution and distance the name of the company 
from the money via offshore companies and banks. The creation of this sector shows how the 
company structure, its norms, and culture were modified to enhance the corruption process.  
 When the ‘Modus operandi’ of the slush fund generation and distribution was structured in the 
1990s, the idea was to have a ‘Wall of China’ segregating the legal entity, that is, the corporate area, 
from the distribution team. Likewise, distribution should naturally be controlled by its financial 
system, checks, and balances. At that time, we believed that in doing so, we would avoid more 
distortion than letting each project/entrepreneur generate its own slush fund and distribute it through 
fictitious contracts, contaminating even the official accounts of the company. For this reason, the 
corporate executives of the group should not functionally relate to the people responsible for the 
distribution, and the payments through unrecorded resources were the sole responsibility of the 
people who authorized them. (Collaborator attachment text file) 
The relationship between caciques and godfathers may start as cronyism, a specific type of 
corruption between bounded people (Dobos, 2017; Khatri et al., 2006). However, it developed 
into second-order and organizational corruption by changing rules, culture and processes inside 
the company. Godfathers and caciques had complementary and relational power to change the 
entities in which they were interested. 
Changing norms outside the organizations 
Some definitions of corruption describe a simple exchange of money for specific compensation 
(Nye, 1967). This type of bribery also occurred, for example, during the purchase of provisional 
measures3 (MP). ‘The first of them is the theme related to ‘Refis da Crise’ [...], in which I acted 
for the government to approve MP 470’ (Collaborator attachment file). MP470 was one of 
the paybacks from a bribe of BRL 50 million (approximately USD 12.5 million). This measure 
provided an installment program for tax debts. While this is second-order corruption acting in 
federal laws, this behavior is treated by the company as a normal lobbying transaction (Jia, 
2018; Nelson, 2017). According to the collaborators, MP470 could not exist the way it does if 
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not for the spurious relationship Odebrecht had with the government. This exchange can be 
seen as equality matching where each one gets what they desired and the relationship ends 
there. It is worth mentioning that this kind of exchange was more common with low-level 
executives to gain public contracts, but as we see here it can also buy presidential acts (Fiske, 
1992). 
 Almost every meeting I had with him, I would carry an agenda, [...] of demands, and at the end of 
the meeting, or in the middle, He would say, look, (Name), help me here, you have that payment 
you have to deliver. (Collaborator testimony) 
Other specific private gains resulted from personal relationships, built over time, creating the 
expectation of future donations. Personal relationships, idealized as eternal, create a common 
pool of resources where executives and politicians may take what they need when they need 
(Fiske, 1992). That happened when one of the executives claimed to agree to give BRL 150 
million (approximately USD 37.5 million) over time to a group of politicians in what they 
called an Italian Spreadsheet. This money could be requested any time after the agreement and, 
in exchange, the politicians would support the company in any way it needed in the future.  
 When it arrived in 2014, he expected me to add over 100 million. He had already used 50 million 
and expected more 100 million, why? Because I had a big agenda with him, we had constant 
meetings. (Collaborator testimony).  
To the executives, these connections were based on a trinity of performance, personal relations 
and money, which gave them access to power. 
 The relationship between the person and the organization with a certain public agent is based on a 
trinity. That is, the performance, the organization's ability to deliver what is legitimate, what the 
governor wants, the president wants, investment and everything... the personal relationship, you 
build trust. And money to meet the interests, be it political or private of the person. (Collaborator 
testimony) 
A long-term relationship was created and keeping track of the reward for the bribery or the 
donation became unnecessary in a communal sharing interaction (Fiske, 1992). They had a 
deal based on expectations. Godfathers expected access to power and to influence the political 
agenda. Political chiefs expected campaign contributions and bribes. This adds to the theory 
that the role of caciques is beyond that of merely distributing money, they also had their 
campaigns sponsored by executives who, with this relationship, prospered in their private 
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organizations. The scheme established politicians and executives in positions of power for 
years. The relationship also sustained caciques positions and relevance within the parties. 
 It has always been clear that, the larger the agenda for the group's business interests and the more 
government support for our business demands, the greater the expectations and requests for 
‘financial support’, supposedly intended for the elections. (Collaborator testimony) 
In their collaboration, the managers put themselves in a situation where demands were 
legitimate. They had to pay for the state to do what it should have been doing anyway. That is 
a way of rationalizing corruption (De Klerk, 2017).  
 Even in the pursuit of legitimate interests, as I mentioned, the issue of the Corinthians arena, the 
Cuba issue, and other bills. That even, that's what I'm saying. They were legit, legitimate interests, 
you looked for, they were interesting. But in that process of interaction with the public authorities, 
you end up […] engaging in some illicit behaviors (Collaborator testimony) 
These payments influenced the state and privileged some sectors to the detriment of others. 
Politicians worked for themselves and specific companies. They had an agenda to discuss and 
resolve in exchange for money and expectations of campaign donations. However, they also 
had long term relationships that influenced their decisions. When asking the state for support 
in the form of loans to foreign projects, Odebrecht executives had the political influence, 
technical arguments, and lobbyists inside that were necessary to get the loan approved. 
Although I said all our [government] loans had a ‘technical basis’. Now it's important that we have 
people who warn us: look you're going to have a problem here, you'll have trouble there, you need 
that kind of guarantee. (Collaborator testimony) 
For Odebrecht, the relationship with the state opened doors for investments, financing, 
contracts, concessions, and even internationalization (see Rêgo et al., 2016). Corruption was 
both individual and structural. The executives argue that the corruption network formed ties so 
strong that Odebrecht gave 3.7 billion dollars in campaign donations without any direct return, 
only favors, and agenda. They even participated in construction projects with no clear profit 
motive.  
Corinthians stadium, where FIFA held the opening ceremony of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, is 
an example. Odebrecht claims to have built the stadium at the request of a politician, even 
though it could cause financial losses for the company. ‘I think that in the end, we lose, 
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Corinthians lose, the bank loses all. It is a game where everyone loses.’ (Collaborator 
testimony). Its construction is part of an old relationship between two individuals with power 
positions both in the private and public sectors. By constructing the stadium, Odebrecht ensured 
that they maintained their position and access to power. ‘Basically, a request from (Name), 
[who said] “look, help Corinthians to build the stadium.”’ (Collaborator testimony). 
Campaign donations and personal relationships are two facets of the affiliation between 
godfathers and caciques. Some of the Odebrecht requests to the government, especially those 
related to public contracts, needed technical arguments to win bids or approval for financing. 
To these ends they used partners, associations, lobbyists, often people within the government 
or chosen by a political chief, with power to build a coalition and present arguments to convince 
politicians or technically endorse their predefined decisions. However, this legal corporate 
political activity (CPA) is only one part of the entire process of patron-client politics. These 
CPAs were used to make the official request to the state, while personal and corrupt 
relationships granted the approval from behind the stage.  
 In our evaluation, the final result that she (the Lobbyist) generated was not anything (illegal), that 
is, she did not defend a loan that did not make sense, she did not defend something that had no 
technical background, but she worked. When I say she worked, for example, if we had a loan to put 
on the agenda and maybe that loan would take two or three meetings of the COFIG4, she helped us 
to advance the credit. [...] This loan has that kind of problem. Many times, you go, if you do not 
solve this issue you get kicked out of COFIG, you have to come back and order again, she already 
advanced it for us (Collaborator testimony). 
In summary, the relationships worked between the executives at Odebrecht and members of 
the state by changing the organizational culture and structure. It occurred throughout the entire 
company hierarchy and in all government spheres. This huge interaction with the state, with 
numerous relationships within this model, built the systemic corruption network. The result 
was the change in public contracts, Brazilian laws, and company processes over the years.  
Back to Theory  
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Zyglidopoulos (2016) defines first and second-order corruption from the idea that corruption 
is based on the abuse of power. We develop that idea, bringing together the theory of individual 
and relational power and corruption theory with the case study. From that, it was possible to 
offer three propositions (P) that develop the precedents and outcomes of second-order 
corruption. In this section, we elaborate on those propositions and demonstrate the relationship 
between the constructs based on the case study and the theory. Figure 1 shows the constructs 
and propositions that relate to then to be further developed. 
  
Figure 1: Constructs and their relations 
Anand et al. (2004) state that corruption comes from positions of power or from the misuse of 
a public role (Nye, 1967). However, for second-order corruption, this abuse of power needs to 
change the rules to benefit the agents or their organization. Therefore, it is necessary to first 
define the kind of power that is being abused. 
In the case of Odebrecht, every connection between the public and the private sector described 
in the collaborations points to a personal relationship. Consequently, these nodes only have 
decision-making power due to their position in the corrupt structure. From one side there is the 
godfather who relates directly with a cacique. He is responsible for getting the authorization of 
his superior, allocating the source of the money, and asking the structured operations sector to 
arrange the payment through a middleman. ‘Part of this payment may have been via an official 
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bonus (donations), […], one part was slush funds, one part an offshore account’ (Collaborator 
testimony). 
The politician, on the other hand, is responsible for allocating this money to his partners and 
political associates and giving the company access to power. This access could result in specific 
compensation such as a provisional measure, or an extensive agenda with multiple types of 
political demands. That would benefit the company and therefore the executive. 
The established relationships are forms used by the executives to gain access to the power of 
the state. The abuse of the power of the state over time creates second-order corruption because 
the state finds itself indebted to private sector control (Barley, 2007). Thus, second-order 
corruption is not the abuse of the position of the individual for their gain, but rather an abuse 
of power accessed through the relationship between individuals. Therefore, this type of 
corruption should be treated as a systemic and interconnected activity (Nielsen, 2003).  
Second-order corruption is the corruption that changes norms to the benefit of individuals or 
organizations (Zyglidopoulos, 2016). However, organizational corruption is the corruption that 
cannot be ended if processes are not changed because they were compromised (Pinto et al., 
2008). This definition overlap is seen in the example of caciques and godfathers that developed 
into changing organizational processes and state laws, transforming actions into structures 
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997) they change entities, organizational and state norms (Sturm & 
Antonakis, 2015). Therefore, it is possible to contribute to the definition of second-order 
corruption as in proposition 1. 
Proposition 1:  Individual agency and structural factors contribute to the change of norms, rules 
or processes in second-order corruption. 
Empirically, it is possible to observe how corruption is a multidimensional phenomenon 
(Lange, 2008). Therefore, the research on corruption needs to consider the micro, meso and 
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macro levels of analysis in a comprehensive and systemic view of corruption (Brass et al., 
1998; Nielsen, 2003). Individual actions and relationships of power transformed cronyism into 
systemic corruption and gave place to structural changes that reified corruption in rules (Barley 
& Tolbert, 1997; Khatri et al., 2006). 
The power mentioned here is not only that inherent to authority, nor is it the ability to 
manipulate or coerce others to your will, causing them to do something they do not want to do 
(Lukes, 1974). The use of power here is a win-win strategy. It rests in the relationship of trust 
between a public and a private agent. Power is a relational aspect of their connection. It is not 
a coercive power, as both agents win from its abuse (Clegg, 1989; Fleming & Spicer, 2014). 
We argue that the abuse of power in second-order corruption is bigger than that given by an 
individual position. It is a power exerted on a network of complexity; therefore, to change 
norms for private gain, it is necessary to be connected, to be able to exert power over 
relationships and then abuse it. It is a manipulation of power in which individuals create or 
modify norms for their benefit through social interaction (Fiske, 1992; Fleming & Spicer, 
2014). 
More important than the position they occupy are the structures and relationships of political 
chiefs and executives that allow power to be abused for private gain. Power is embedded in 
structures and human relationships (Fleming & Spicer, 2014). Relational power is that which 
is abused, in collusion, to modify norms in second-order corruption, as seen in proposition 2. 
Proposition 2:  Individual powers can be exchanged to create relational power. 
For years the corruption in Odebrecht brought the company closer to the government. The 
result of this scheme was massive control over government decisions but also the guaranteed 
continuation of politicians in their positions. This context of second-order corruption, created 
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by the abuse of relational power, has two consequences that matter for organizational 
corruption. On the one hand, the corruption is seen as normal, because the structures around it 
are part of the habits of people, and it is not a single event, but rather an everyday relationship 
(Graaf, 2007; Nelson, 2017). On the other hand, the trust that is required for acts of corruption 
enhances personal relationships and results in the rationalization of corruption. The executives 
try to exempt themselves from guilt over doing the wrong thing, which also contributes to 
continued corruption (De Klerk, 2017). 
Several examples can be used to describe how corruption has become normal in the routine 
operations of Odebrecht. ‘All this [corruption], that is happening now, it was a thing 
institutionalized, it was a normal business’ (Collaborator testimony). They used 
intermediaries and partners to carry illegal payments as part of the corrupt network. The 
structured operations sector was responsible for illegal payments. Executives of Odebrecht 
received their bonuses through the illegal system and could ask for illegal payments to gain 
specific advantages or maintain relationships. As Nelson (2017) argues, corruption becomes 
the norm when too many people get used to it. In those cases, a toxic culture is created. By 
creating a culture of corruption, the force of domination power is in place and establishes both 
ideological and preeminent views. The individual either accepts it or leaves (Fleming & Spicer, 
2014; Pagès et al., 1998). Second-order corruption, based on relational power, leads to 
normalization of corruption, as stated in proposition 3a. 
Proposition 3a: Second-order corruption reifies power into rules, normalizing corruption. 
Proposition 3b: Second-order corruption leads individuals to rationalize corruption. 
Finally, as seen in proposition 3b, the abuse of relational power also influenced the 
rationalization of corruption. The executives kept stating that their acts were necessary and 
legitimate and that they were doing good things for the development of the country. ‘For the 
30 
 
venture to be successful and to be concluded in time to generate energy for the needs that 
Brazil, we can say, demanded’ (Collaborator testimony).   
At the time of the collaboration process, the executives had already been found guilty and 
incarcerated. By collaborating they aimed to reduce their sentences, although the process of 
rationalization and deconstruction of rationalization was evident. They are now consciously 
aware that what they did was wrong, however, to redeem themselves from the guilt they created 
excuses, blaming the company and the structure. They also state that their actions were 
legitimate because they would benefit the company and the country. 
Thinking about the context of corruption, and the continuum of destructiveness, the executives 
were in an environment of second-order corruption that made corruption a norm. They 
participated in corruption as guilty perpetrators. Their acts were propelled by their position in 
the organization and impelled by their culture (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2008). By 
rationalizing, individuals are engaging in a changing of self, giving unconscious excuses to act 
against their own morals. The power acting here is subjectivation, in the sense that it molds the 
identity and beliefs of individuals (Fleming & Spicer, 2014). They attain ethical distance and 
are pushed through the continuum of destructiveness (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2008).  
Conclusion 
As Zyglidopoulos (2016) argues, second-order corruption is harder to address, because of its 
perpetuation across levels of hierarchy. However, the rules are changed by the abuse of 
relational power, and not only by the power of positions or authorities. We carried a single case 
study and found that individual agency and structural factors impact Second-order corruption; 
the social exchange of individual powers creates relational power; Second-order corruption 
impacts the normalization and rationalization of corruption. 
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The use of qualitative methods with recent developments in power and corruption theories can 
be beneficial to systemic corruption research, given the necessity of empirical analysis of 
corruption (Nielsen, 2003). This study also enhances the definitions of caciques and godfathers, 
considering the Brazilian context, and highlights the relational power that those actors have 
within the structure. They are bounded both by the corrupt practices and the necessity of 
pursuing the interests of their organizations in a murky environment. 
The abuse of power was a win-win strategy of power manipulation (Fleming & Spicer, 2014). 
These long-term relationships between political chiefs and godfathers enabled them to have an 
agenda with the government without necessarily making payments for each of their demands. 
They were partners, and their association benefited the company and political operators to the 
detriment of Brazilian society. This description of a personal relationship is intended to 
demonstrate how the connection between two nodes of the larger network enabled corrupt acts 
by individuals but also framed their actions inside the overall corruption system.  
Second-order corruption creates rules for private benefit; however, the power that is being 
abused is individual and relational. Internal mechanisms and cultures also are modified. 
Second-order corruption leads to the normalization and rationalization of corruption, pushing 
agents further into the continuum of destructiveness (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2008). 
Odebrecht and the other companies were caught by Operation Carwash with the aid of plea 
bargain collaborations. Some of the mechanisms of corruption were dismantled such as the 
prohibition of campaign donations from companies since 2016. Despite the board president 
remaining the same, the president of the holding was replaced, the processes seemed to be 
changing, and they started a ‘journey of transformation’, as they called it (Odebrecht, 2018). 
However, many of the laws they purchased and the contracts they gained throughout the years 
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of corruption still need to be reviewed. Those significant changes and forms of combat open 
future research questions. 
The propositions are based on a single case study and current theories on second-order 
corruption and power. They can be developed and tested with future research. Corruption is 
socially constructed, and changes in norms, rules, and habits take time  (Warburton, 2013). 
Therefore, a longitudinal study may be appropriate to investigate the effects of second-order 
corruption on rules and norms. Specifically, the idea that individual powers can be exchanged 
to be transformed into relational power may be key to understanding the growth of systemic 
corruption in the upper echelons of organizations. Also, the normalization and rationalization 
of corruption as possible consequences of second-order corruption needs to be further studied.  
Both are important concepts in combating corruption because if they are not addressed, they 
can lead to more corruption (Nelson, 2017; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2008). 
Footnotes 
 1 Some native Brazilians designate the chief of a tribe with the word cacique. 
2 Following the recommendation of the ethical committee and the juridical idea that people 
have the right to be forgotten (Weber, 2011), the names will remain confidential.  
3 Provisional measures (medidas provisórias): Similar to executive orders in the United States, 
these measures, signed by the president, work as law for sixty days and can become permanent 
with the approval of Congress. 
4 COFIG (Export Financing and Guarantee Committee) - Administrative body that monitors 
the operations of the Exportation Financing Program 
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